

MEMORANDUM FOR:

A/NIO/GPF

25X1

On your Treaty Red Team proposal, great minds run in similar directions. Larry and I come to the same view as you. Why don't you and Larry get together and discuss the subject further.

Harry Rowen  
C/NIC

Date 26 Apr 83

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## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #3028-83  
25 April 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, National Intelligence Council

VIA : National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces *Gold*

FROM :  25X1

Assistant NIO for General Purpose Forces

SUBJECT : US/Soviet Treaty Red Team

1. Hearing Larry Gershwin's pitch on Soviet manipulation of treaty provisions spurred the following ruminations, unencumbered by previous study or experience:

- Wouldn't it be worthwhile for us to have a Red Team to scrutinize in minute detail all provisions proposed by both sides for US/USSR treaties? Although we no doubt examine all treaties to look for loopholes, perhaps a more systematic, specialized approach would have better results.
- 2. A Treaty Red Team should be lean and without other duties:
  - A chief, who not only speaks, but thinks in, Russian with a background in Soviet negotiating techniques. He would report to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs or the Secretary of State and would be charged with organizing the critique of Soviet proposals and draft US proposals for treaties and other agreements with the primary purpose of determining current and future Soviet exploitation of loopholes.
  - A couple of deputies, also Soviet experts, but conversant in specialized fields--arms control, commerce, diplomacy. The deputies would work with (but not for) the ambassadors charged with specific treaty negotiation.

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- A small administrative staff.
- The Chief would have a charter allowing him to tap other governmental agencies for experts in various treaty subjects to assist in looking at the long term effects and relative advantages of various provisions.

3. No doubt these functions are already performed by various State Department bureaus and ACDA, but a more independent--essentially cynical, non-political, and negative--approach might serve to better inform us in advance of weak treaty provision proposals.



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